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Legislative Intent to Trick: Three Decades on, why 
Vermont Yankee’s Outcome Demands a Re-Working 
of Pacific Gas 
[P]reemption may be the most important issue for modern 
federalism theory . . . . Constricting state regulatory authority 
reduces states’ capacity to provide benefits to their citizens, which 
in turn diminishes states’ effectiveness at checking national 
expansionism in the political process.1 
[T]he relief Entergy is requesting is extraordinary . . . . It is 
essentially saying that federal law requires Vermont to host a 
nuclear power plant it doesn’t want.2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the State of Vermont tried to legislatively force the 
closure of Vermont Yankee, a nuclear power plant owned by the 
Louisiana-based Entergy Corporation. Since 1972, Vermont Yankee 
produced approximately one third of the electricity in Vermont.3 
However, in light of a variety of concerns held by Vermont’s 
citizens,4 Vermont decided to move away from such a reliance on 
nuclear energy. On August 14, 2013, following a lengthy battle in 
court, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding—the 
State of Vermont was barred from closing down Entergy’s nuclear 
plant for the reasons put forth by the State.5 It seemed that the 
nuclear business was there to stay, whether the Vermont legislature 
liked it or not. 
The economic winds had not yet subsided for Entergy’s Vermont 
Yankee, however. Ten days later, in spite of Entergy’s double victory 
in court, the Company announced that its nuclear plant would 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by KATHERINE B. WELLS. 
 1. Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 513 
(2010). 
 2. Court Denies Preliminary Injunction in Vermont Yankee Case, 
VERMONTBIZ (July 19, 2011), http://www.vermontbiz.com/news/july/court-denies-
preliminary-injunction-vermont-yankee-case, archived at http://perma.cc/6PZ4- 
D6RV (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 3. See Steven F. Ferrey, State Wars – The Empire Strikes Back, 65 BAYLOR 
L.REV. 1, 7 n.26 (2013). See also State Nuclear Profiles, Vermont, ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., www.eia.gov/nuclear/state/vermont/pdf/vermont.pdf, archived at http:  
//perma.cc/E84W-GY2S (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
 4. These concerns were both economic and safety-related and are 
discussed infra. 
 5. See generally Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 190 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
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nonetheless be eventually shutting down for economic reasons in 
2014.6 Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin7 exemplifies the nuclear industry 
winning the legal battle but ultimately losing the economic war. 
In its ruling, the Second Circuit held that the State of Vermont 
was federally preempted by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) from 
passing state laws touching on radiological safety that had the 
unilateral effect of shutting down a nuclear power plant. The Second 
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s instruction from 30 years ago 
in Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation8 
where the Court noted, in dicta, that “a state prohibition on nuclear 
construction for safety reasons would also be in the teeth of the 
Atomic Energy Act’s objective . . . and would be preempted for that 
reason.”9 Following the Pacific Gas instruction, the Second Circuit 
found that because the Vermont legislature was improperly 
motivated by nuclear energy safety concerns when it passed the laws 
in question, the laws were impliedly preempted by the AEA.10 
However, instruction does not necessarily create a precedent, and in 
this case, the instruction provided the wrong outcome for Vermont 
Yankee. This comment seeks to explain why Pacific Gas dicta 
provides the wrong outcome in the context of Vermont Yankee, and 
to propose an alternative reasoning that remains true to the AEA’s 
purposes while granting more appropriate autonomy to states. 
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court attempted to explain the state-
federal “dual regulation of nuclear-powered electricity generation”11 
that Congress created when it passed the AEA. However, the Pacific 
Gas Court’s instruction to focus on legislative intent in determining 
whether the state law is preempted—to the complete exclusion of the 
actual effect of a given state law—has created an unclear federal 
preemption standard for both state legislatures and lower courts to 
follow in the nuclear energy context. The Court’s instruction has 
made federal preemption in the nuclear energy context all about 
determining the state legislature’s motivation, which requires courts 
                                                                                                             
 6. Entergy to Close, Decommission Vermont Yankee, ENTERGY (Aug. 27, 
2013), http://www.entergy.com/news_room/newsrelease.aspx?NR_ID=2769, 
archived at http://perma.cc/72ZA-MUQB. 
 7. See generally Vermont Yankee, 733 F. 3d 190 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 8. 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). 
 9. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 422 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State 
Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983)). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. 2011 (2012). 
 11. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 211–12 (“[T]he federal government maintains 
complete control of the safety and “nuclear” aspects of energy generation; the states 
exercise their traditional authority over the need for additional generating capacity, 
the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like.”). 
See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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“to look for something that does not exist.”12 Furthermore, an inquiry 
of this nature creates a perverse rule: If a state legislature can “trick” 
the court and effectively hide its true motive, then the state law must 
stand.13 
This comment critiques the Pacific Gas legislative motive test as 
the method for determining whether federal law preempts a state 
law. Part I provides background on federal preemption in the 
nuclear energy context, reviews the Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
the AEA prior to Vermont Yankee, and outlines the Vermont Yankee 
holding. Part I then analyzes the Vermont Yankee decision, 
concluding that the fundamental problem is not that the Second 
Circuit incorrectly applied Pacific Gas, but instead, the problem is 
that the Pacific Gas instruction to rely on legislative intent leads to 
an ambiguous outcome by putting too much emphasis on the 
inevitably vague motivations of state legislators with too little 
attention given to the actual effect of the state law. Part II contrasts 
the Pacific Gas motive-focused preemption test by analogy to 
federal preemption in the context of immigration law, as well to as 
the AEA’s preemption interpretation in the lower courts. Finally, 
Part III proposes a new nuclear energy federal preemption test, 
which forgoes inquiry into a state legislature’s purpose, emphasizing 
instead the state law’s effect on the nuclear regulatory scheme. 
I. FEDERAL NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW: CONTEXT FOR VERMONT 
YANKEE 
A. What Controls —Federal or State Law? 
1. Supremacy Clause 
The delicate balance of power between the states and the federal 
government is an issue the United States has grappled with since the 
nation’s founding.14 Yet, it still remains a question to this day.15 
                                                                                                             
 12. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) 
(quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. at 651–52(1971)). See also Ferrey, supra note 
3, at 68 (“whether the stated purpose is merely a cover-up for prohibited state 
actions” (internal quotes omitted)). 
 14. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) (“It is 
of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its [Congress’] action 
within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate 
governments.”). 
 15. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“Federalism, 
central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and 
State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. From 
the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or 
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Federal preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution: “The laws of the United States shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.”16 Thus, the federal government has a 
distinct advantage17 because “as long as it is acting within the powers 
granted to it under the Constitution, Congress may legislate in areas 
traditionally regulated by the States.”18 In every case involving 
federal preemption of state law, the purpose of Congress is the 
“ultimate touchstone.”19 
2. Presumption against Preemption in Areas within State 
Police Power 
The “extraordinary power” 20 of the federal government rests on 
an assumption that Congress does not exercise lightly its power to 
legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the states.21 The Supreme 
Court has enunciated the tenet that states maintain great latitude over 
their police powers since these powers have traditionally been seen as 
affecting inherently local matters.22 This presumption against federal 
preemption applies when Congress passes a law that touches on state 
historic police powers, “unless [federal preemption of state law] was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”23 Indeed, when the text 
                                                                                                             
 
at cross-purposes. The Supremacy clause provides a clear rule that federal law ‘shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land. . . .’”). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 2. 
 17. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 
2085 (2000) (“Because the Supremacy Clause prescribes that federal law trumps 
conflicting state laws, Congress in effect possesses ‘an extraordinary power in a 
federalist system’ to displace state regulation.” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). 
 18. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460 (“This is an extraordinary power in a federalist 
system. It is a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly.”). 
 19. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (citing Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 
96, 103 (1963))). 
 20. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (citing Hillsborough 
Cnty. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) and Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). (“Clear and 
manifest,” however, does not have to be explicitly stated by Congress but can 
instead be implied from the way Congress wrote a given statute.). See infra Part 
I.A.3. 
2015] COMMENT 539 
 
 
 
of the preemption clause of a federal statute is ambiguous, the Court 
ordinarily accepts a reading that disfavors federal preemption.24 
3. Three Types of Federal Preemption 
Federal preemption has been described as a judge-made 
doctrine25 “rooted in the juxtaposition of the powers reserved to the 
states and the supremacy of federal law over state law under the 
United States Constitution.”26 In a preemption analysis, courts 
must first define the scope of the preempted field by analyzing the 
language, structure, and purpose of the federal statute to determine 
Congressional intent.27 There are three general situations where 
federal law may preempt a state law: express preemption, conflict 
preemption, and implied preemption.28 
First, express preemption, the most easily identifiable type, 
occurs “where Congress expressly states that it is preempting state 
authority.”29 Second, conflict preemption exists when there is state 
law that actually conflicts with the federal law, and compliance with 
both state and federal requirements would be impossible.30 Third, in 
implied preemption cases, state law may be preempted if the state 
law concerns a field that Congress intended to occupy exclusively.31 
In implied preemption cases, implied congressional intent to 
preempt is found either when a state law “impedes the execution of 
                                                                                                             
 24. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 554 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
 25. Hope Babcock, Can Vermont Put the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle? 
A Test of Congressional Preemption Power, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 691, 718 (2012). 
 26. Laurence H. Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a 
State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 686 (1979). (The “juxtaposition 
of the powers reserved to the states” refers to the Tenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution: “The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.). 
 27. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 218 
(D. Vt. 2012) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 733 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2013). See Allis–
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (whether “state action is 
pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent”); Ingersoll–Rand Co. 
v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (intent is discerned from statutory 
language, structure, and purpose). 
 28. See Laurence H. Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is 
Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 688 (1979). 
 29. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). See also English 
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 30. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 
U.S. 238, 248 (1984). 
 31. English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
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the full purposes and objectives of Congress”32 or where the Act of 
Congress “touch[es] on a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”33 This third 
category is also referred to as field preemption. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that these three categories 
are not “rigidly distinct” and that in some cases “field preemption 
may be understood as a species of conflict preemption.”34 This 
matters because it implies that in crafting a new federal preemption 
test for nuclear energy, one could draw from both conflict 
preemption cases and field preemption cases. There are a number 
of federal laws that regulate the use and transmission of nuclear 
energy35 that, when taken with permissible state nuclear energy 
laws, create a dual regulatory scheme for nuclear energy.36 
However, a proposed state law that concerns nuclear energy must 
take into account whether the state law is preempted by the federal 
nuclear energy dual regulatory scheme.37 
B. The Nuclear Energy Regulatory Scheme 
Under federal law, the AEA is the centerpiece nuclear energy 
safety statute. The first iteration of the AEA was enacted in 1946, 
in the wake of World War II, at a time when Congress thought that 
nuclear power development should be strictly limited to a federal 
government monopoly.38 However, within ten years, Congress 
reconsidered this federal monopoly, a change that resulted in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.39 The 1954 Act came about due to 
Congress’ belief that “the national interest would be served if the 
Government encouraged the private sector to develop atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal regulation 
and licensing.”40 The Act implemented Congress’ policy decision 
                                                                                                             
 32. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 33. English, 469 U.S. at 79. See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947): “[the federal regulatory scheme is] so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”). 
 34. English, 496 U.S. at 79 n. 5 accord Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. 
Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n. 2 (1992). 
 35. See infra Part I.B. 
 36. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 212 (1983). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978). 
See also Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L.& POL’Y F. 
221, 226 (2005). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §§2011–2281 (2012). 
 40. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80–81 (1990). 
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by providing licensing for private construction, ownership, and 
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.41 
However, in spite of Congress’ intent to involve the private 
sector in nuclear development through the 1954 Act, the private 
sector did not immediately embrace nuclear energy development 
due to the disastrous consequences that could arise from a nuclear 
malfunction.42 No company was willing to take on such liability.43 
A representative of General Electric expressed this sentiment 
during congressional hearings when he said that the company 
would not proceed “with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over its 
head.”44 Thus, Congress amended the AEA through the Price-
Anderson Act of 1957,45 which essentially limited the liability that 
a nuclear operator could be responsible for in the event of a 
malfunction.46 Simply put, there was no market to provide 
insurance for nuclear plant operators given the extent of liability 
that could arise from nuclear development. The unavailability of 
insurance was hindering private industry from entering the market 
and developing nuclear energy technology. The purpose of the 
Price-Anderson Act was to both provide liability insurance 
coverage against nuclear hazards and to provide compensation to 
those claiming damages from nuclear hazards.47 
Thereafter in 1959, Congress again amended the AEA to 
“clarify the respective responsibilities of the States and the [Atomic 
Energy] Commission with respect to the regulation of byproduct, 
source, and special nuclear materials.”48 The 1959 Amendment 
authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to turn over some 
regulatory authority to any state that would adopt an approved 
regulatory plan. However, the Commission maintained exclusive 
authority over “the disposal of such . . . byproduct, source, or special 
nuclear material as the Commission determines . . . should, because 
of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be disposed of 
                                                                                                             
 41. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 207. 
 42. See Tomain, supra note 38, at 227. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. 2210 (2012). See Tomain, supra note 38, at 227. 
 46. Silkwood v. Kerr-McKee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (explaining that 
the 1959 Price-Anderson Act created an indemnification scheme which limited 
operators of licensed nuclear facilities to a maximum liability of $60 million. The 
federal government would thereafter provide $500 million in indemnification. 
Licensees were required to purchase the maximum amount of insurance available, 
and the cap on damages would be $560 million in liability for any one nuclear 
accident.). 
 47. Id. at 251 n.12 (quoting S.Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1957), 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1957, p.1810). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. 2021(a)(1) (2012). 
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without a license from the Commission.”49 Thus, the states were 
precluded from regulating safety aspects of nuclear power because 
“the technical safety considerations are of such complexity that it is 
not likely that any State would be prepared to deal with them during 
the foreseeable future.”50 Congress gave the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the regulatory body that preceded the present-day 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “exclusive jurisdiction to 
license the transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession and use 
of nuclear materials. Upon these subjects, no role was left for the 
states.”51 
The rationale for prohibiting states from regulating in these areas 
was “premised on its belief that the [Atomic Energy] Commission 
was more qualified to determine what type of safety standards 
should be enacted in this complex area.”52 Indeed, the 1954 Act 
specifically stated that “the processing and utilization of . . . nuclear 
material must be regulated in the national interest” and that national 
regulation of nuclear materials “is necessary . . . to assure the 
common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of 
the public.”53 However, “[t]here is little doubt that under the [AEA] 
of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are 
empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for 
power.”54 
The AEA has two savings clauses that reserve certain regulatory 
powers—not related to nuclear safety—to the states.55 The first 
savings clause says that the AEA does not restrict state authority in 
regulating the “generation, sale, or transmission of electric power 
produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the 
Commission.”56 The second savings clause says that the AEA shall 
not be “construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency 
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against 
radiation hazards.”57 The two savings clauses read together have 
been understood to mean that the states may have control over 
energy generation and transmission, except for when it comes to 
                                                                                                             
 49. 42 U.S.C. 2021 (c)(4). 
 50. H.R.Rep. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959). See also Silkwood, 
464 U.S. at 250 (1984). 
 51. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 207 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
 52. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. 2012(c–e) (2012). 
 54. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 550 (1978). 
 55. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 410 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. 2018. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. 2021(k). 
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protecting its citizens against radiation hazards—that power falls 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.58 
C. Supreme Court on the AEA: States, (Sometimes) Stay Away 
from Safety! 
The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ intent behind the 
AEA in three key cases during the past three decades. Pacific Gas 
concerned whether the AEA preempted California from passing 
laws that conditioned the construction of a new nuclear plant on the 
development of a nuclear waste disposal program;59 Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee addressed whether a state tort award of $10.5 million 
in punitive damages against a nuclear power facility was preempted 
by the AEA;60 and English v. General Electric addressed whether a 
nuclear power plant employee’s emotional distress tort claim against 
her nuclear power plant employer was preempted by the AEA.61 It is 
worth noting that the three Supreme Court AEA cases came to the 
opposite conclusion from the Second Circuit’s decision in Vermont 
Yankee. None of the three leading Supreme Court cases on federal 
preemption in the nuclear context found that the state law at issue 
was preempted by the AEA. While the conduct in the three Supreme 
Court cases was distinguishable from that in Vermont Yankee, this 
pattern nonetheless contrasts directly with the holding in Vermont 
Yankee, where the Second Circuit determined that Vermont’s laws 
were preempted by the AEA and accordingly struck them down. 
1. Pacific Gas and Electric 
In Pacific Gas, the State of California passed two laws that 
conditioned the construction of nuclear power plants on the 
availability of storage facilities and an adequate means of disposing 
of the nuclear waste that would be produced by the nuclear plants.62 
Section 25524.1(b) of the Warren-Alquist Act required that the 
California Energy Commission determine whether there would be 
sufficient capacity to store the used nuclear fuel rods, essentially 
addressing the issue of short-term storage of spent nuclear rods.63 
                                                                                                             
 58. See Babcock, supra note 25, at 704. See also Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d 
393, 410 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 59. See 461 U.S. 190, 194 (1983). 
 60. See 464 U.S. 238, 245–46 (1984). 
 61. See 496 U.S. 72, 77–78 (1990). 
 62. See 461 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1983). 
 63. Id. at 195. It should likewise be noted that no permanent disposal 
method existed at the time these laws were passed and even today, no permanent 
nuclear waste disposal mechanism has been developed. 
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Section 25524.2 addressed the long-term barriers to permanently 
storing nuclear waste and imposed a moratorium on construction of 
new nuclear power plants until the Atomic Energy Commission 
developed a plan for permanently disposing of the nuclear waste.64 
The California Energy Commission found that the federal 
government had not yet developed an adequate system for 
permanently storing nuclear waste.65 Therefore, even though the 
nuclear power company had obtained the federal licensing permits 
as required by the AEA, state laws nonetheless blocked the power 
company from constructing a nuclear power plant in California. 
In spite of these two laws that seemed to directly address 
concerns regarding the manner in which nuclear waste would be 
permanently disposed of—a concern that clearly touches on worries 
about nuclear safety—the Supreme Court effectively read an 
“avowedly economic purpose”66 into the statutes. The Supreme 
Court held that in light of California’s economic purpose behind the 
two laws—the effect of which was to block a private company from 
constructing a nuclear plant in California—the laws were permitted 
to stand. No preemption by the AEA regulatory scheme was found 
in spite of documentation in the legislative history which stated that 
California was concerned with the construction of a nuclear power 
plant due to concern about radiation safety hazards. 
The Court stated that it would not become “embroiled in 
attempting to ascertain California’s true motive.”67 The Court then 
explained that such inquiries are often fruitless since “[w]hat 
motivates one legislator to vote for a statute is not necessarily what 
motivates scores of others to enact it” and because states have 
clearly been allowed to regulate regarding their initial need for 
nuclear power.68 The Court found an economic purpose in the 
California statutes, and the statutes were upheld regardless of points 
made in the nuclear company’s Brief.69 
In its Brief, the Pacific Gas Company pointed out that 
California was very much concerned with nuclear safety when it 
passed these two laws.70 And, because safety concerns were 
relegated to the federal government, these California laws, which 
effectively halted the nuclear company’s construction of a new 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. at 195. 
 65. Id. at 197. 
 66. Id. at 216. See Babcock, supra note 25, at 709–10. 
 67. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Com'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 216 (1983). 
 68. Id. at 216. 
 69. Brief for Petitioner, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & 
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (No. 81-1945), 1982 WL 957209, at *7. 
 70. Id. 
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plant, should have been preempted by the AEA. Pacific Gas 
Company’s Brief noted that  
[t]he Reassessment dealt at length with the radiological 
hazards created by nuclear power plants and their waste 
and includes the following passage: 
 
The [State Energy] commission does not have clear and 
explicit authority to condition its approval on demonstrations 
of waste disposal safety or reactor safety, but the same 
problems could be addressed indirectly through reviews of 
the economics and reliability of the plant and through 
specific siting criteria (minimum distance from populated 
areas, minimum distance from active faults).71 
The preamble of the California statutes had no reference to passing 
these laws on the basis of economic need. The Supreme Court read 
in an economic intent on their own and notably glossed over 
references to California’s enunciated nuclear safety worries. This 
holding has been interpreted as expanding the authority of states 
within the nuclear energy dual regulatory scheme.72 
In accepting California’s economic purpose as the rationale for 
enacting its state laws, the Supreme Court also gave its impression 
on the importance given to the California legislature’s underlying 
motive in passing the two statutes. The result of the Pacific Gas 
decision was that states had the power to decide on economic 
grounds whether they wanted nuclear power in their jurisdiction. If 
there was a non-safety rationale for a given state law, the state law 
could avoid AEA preemption, as long as the law was enacted in 
light of the state’s economic need for nuclear power.73 
Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the holding. Though 
they agreed in result, the concurrence did not sign on to portion of the 
majority opinion which held that a state must not be motivated by 
safety when it is determining whether to allow the construction of a 
nuclear power plant within the state’s jurisdiction.74 Justice Blackmun 
did not believe that the federal government through the AEA “has 
occupied the broader field of nuclear safety concerns, but instead only 
the narrower area of how a nuclear plant should be constructed and 
operated to protect against radiation hazards.”75 Justice Blackmun 
found that “[t]here is, in short, no evidence that Congress had a ‘clear 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
 72. Babcock, supra note 25, at 709–10. 
 73. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). 
 74. Id. at 223. 
 75. Id. at 224. 
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and manifest purpose’ to force States to be blind to whatever special 
dangers are posed by nuclear power plants.”76 Based on this 
reasoning, if Justice Blackmun had been on the Second Circuit when 
it decided Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin, he would have likely found 
two of the three Vermont laws permissible under the AEA. 
2. Silkwood 
In the following term, the Supreme Court decided Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corporation,77 another case where a state law was 
allowed to stand in the face of AEA federal preemption. In 
Silkwood, a woman who worked at the Kerr-McGee nuclear plant 
discovered that she had been contaminated by plutonium while at 
work, finding plutonium on her body, as well as at her apartment 
and on her roommate. During the investigation of the plutonium 
leak, the NRC determined that the nuclear plant had complied with 
practically all of the federally mandated NRC safety procedures.78 
At trial, however, the court instructed the jury that the purpose of 
punitive damages was to punish the nuclear corporation and deter 
it from engaging in dangerous conduct in the future. With this 
instruction in mind, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in 
the amount of $505,000 for actual damages and $10,000,000 for 
punitive damages, even though the NRC determined that the 
nuclear plant had essentially complied with the only standards it 
was required to follow—federal safety standards.79 
The Supreme Court held, in spite of the state tort law which in 
this case allowed for a significantly large $10 million punitive 
damages jury verdict against the nuclear power plant, that 
Congress nonetheless had not intended for the AEA to preclude 
state law punitive tort actions against nuclear corporations.80 This 
large damages award was decided by a state court jury that had had 
been instructed by the state court judge to return a dollar figure that 
would punish the nuclear power company, even though the nuclear 
plant had followed practically all the federal rules.81 Even though 
allowing such a huge award by a state court due to a nuclear safety 
leak effectively created an additional means of regulating the 
nuclear power plant, the majority nonetheless held that the AEA 
                                                                                                             
 76. Id. at 225 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)). 
 77. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
 78. Id. at 244. 
 79. Id. at 245. 
 80. Id. at 258. 
 81. Id. at 284. 
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did not preempt this state law cause of action. The nuclear power 
plant was therefore forced to pay the award.82 
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger dissented.83 
In his 15 page dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out the incongruity 
between the Pacific Gas holding that said that “the Federal 
Government has occupied the entire field of safety concerns”84 and 
the Silkwood majority, which said that a state-authorized $10 million 
punitive damages award against a nuclear corporation based on safety 
concerns was allowed to punish the corporation even though the 
corporation had been largely in compliance with the NRC rules and 
any shortcomings were not found to have caused the plutonium 
contamination at issue.85 Justice Powell dissented separately with 11 
pages of written reasons, concluding that “this case is a disquieting 
example of how the jury system can function as an unauthorized 
regulatory medium.”86 He found that the majority’s decision ignored 
Pacific Gas’s holding that “Congress has occupied the entire field of 
nuclear safety concerns.”87 
The Silkwood holding is important to the Vermont Yankee case 
because it shows an instance where, in spite of the Court previously 
saying that “Congress has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety 
concerns,” this is, in fact, not entirely accurate. The cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury and damages in Silkwood—plutonium contamination 
of person and property—was directly related to nuclear safety 
concerns. Oddly, however, these damages were found to be outside of 
the federally preempted “entire field of nuclear concerns.” Such a 
holding demonstrates the elasticity of the Pacific Gas standard88—an 
elasticity that was not, but should have been, taken into account by 
the Second Circuit in Vermont Yankee. 
3. English v. General Electric 
In English v. General Electric, Justice Blackmun wrote for a 
unanimous Court, finding that a nuclear power plant employee’s 
state law intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim 
was not preempted by the federal nuclear regulatory scheme.89 The 
employee’s claim was based on her emotional distress after having 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. 
 83. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 258. 
 84. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). 
 85. 464 U.S. 238, 274 and 277 (1984). 
 86. Id. at 283. 
 87. Id. at 286. 
 88. See Babcock, supra note 25, at 709–710 (2012). 
 89. 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990). 
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been ostracized, and ultimately terminated, by management at work, 
after she pointed out a safety violation at the plant. In spite of the 
employee being terminated for complaining to management about 
safety issues at the power plant, the Court found that the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress state law claim “did not have some 
direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who 
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety 
levels.”90 The Court instead found that this state law claim really 
only concerned retaliation against whistleblowers in general.91 For 
this reason, the state law fell outside of the federally preempted field 
of radiological safety concerns. Especially in light of its prior 
decision in Silkwood, the Court found: 
[I]t would be odd, if not irrational to conclude that 
Congress intended to include tort actions stemming from 
retaliation against whistleblowers in the preempted field 
but intended not to include tort actions stemming from 
radiation damage suffered as a result of actual safety 
violation.92 
English makes several relevant points concerning the Vermont 
Yankee decision. One is the Court’s “direct and substantial effect” 
language that could be used to determine the outer bounds of a 
more fitting nuclear preemption test in the wake of Vermont 
Yankee.93 Another noteworthy point from English is that this is one 
case in the nuclear energy preemption context where all the 
Justices agree. This whistleblower cause of action was not 
preempted by the AEA; thus it serves as a guidepost for what all 
the Justices have agreed is outside the currently unclear “entire 
field of nuclear safety concerns.”94  
D. Vermont Yankee Interpretation of Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence 
 In Vermont Yankee v. Shumlin,95 the Second Circuit was tasked 
with interpreting the above Supreme Court jurisprudence in light of 
a circumstance that had effectively been described by Justice 
Blackmun in his concurrence in Pacific Gas96—whether a state 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 86. 
 93. See infra Part III. 
 94. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 212 (1983). 
 95. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 96. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 224. 
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could pass laws that would have the effect of requiring a nuclear 
power plant to terminate its operations. In 2005, the State of 
Vermont decided that it no longer wanted nuclear power to be 
generated within its jurisdiction.97 This decision was documented by 
the Vermont Legislature’s passage of three laws that would require 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant to close down in 2014. 
First, Act 74 was state legislation that concerned an increase of 
nuclear waste storage by Vermont Yankee. This Act came in 
response to Entergy’s request to increase Vermont Yankee’s power 
output by 20%, which would have resulted in a concomitant 
increase in nuclear waste.98 Entergy had already received NRC 
approval to build additional temporary nuclear waste storage 
facilities, but under Vermont law, constructing new nuclear waste 
storage was prohibited unless specifically authorized by the state 
legislature.99 
The law contained an exemption for Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corporation (VYPC). However, the Vermont Attorney 
General interpreted this exemption as only applying to the previous 
owner of the plant, VYPC, but not the new plant owner, Entergy.100 
Act 74 had the effect of requiring the Vermont Legislature to 
affirmatively vote on whether new nuclear storage facilities could be 
built in Vermont.101 This decision-making power was previously 
vested in the Vermont Public Service Board, whose decision could 
be appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.102 Entergy, however, 
had no mechanism to appeal a decision by the Vermont Legislature, 
which eventually decided not to allow the construction of new 
nuclear storage facilities. Without such an affirmative go-ahead, 
Vermont Yankee would be forced to close.103 
Second, Act 160 was state legislation requiring state legislative 
approval to operate Vermont Yankee after 2012.104 The law required 
that “a nuclear energy generating plant may be operated in Vermont 
only with the explicit approval of the General Assembly.”105 Act 
160 stated that the Vermont Legislature should consider “the state’s 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 6, Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee LLC v. 
Shumlin, 773 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2012), 2012 WL 2064593, which details Vermont’s 
long-term plan to “move from nonrenewable sources of energy, such as oil, gas, and 
nuclear, toward energy efficiency and renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind 
and biomass.” 
 98. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 398. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 423. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 414. 
 105. Id. at 403. 
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need for power, the economic and environmental impacts of long-
term storage of nuclear waste, and choice of power sources among 
various alternatives.”106 
Third, Act 189 was state legislation requiring state inspection of 
Vermont Yankee.107 This Act required Department inspections of 
Vermont Yankee’s operations “such as its electrical, emergency, and 
mechanical systems.”108 The Act created an oversight panel of 
nuclear power experts that were appointed by the Vermont governor 
and legislature.109 
 In determining that Acts 74 and 160 were preempted by federal 
law (and Act 189 not ripe for judicial review) the district court and the 
Second Circuit relied on explicit language from Pacific Gas. 110 
There, the Supreme Court stated, in dicta that “a state prohibition on 
nuclear construction for safety reasons would also be in the teeth of 
the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that nuclear technology 
be safe enough for widespread development and use — and would be 
preempted for that reason.”111 The Second Circuit considered the 
legislative record that was replete with references to closing down 
Vermont Yankee on the basis of safety concerns and held that under 
Pacific Gas, “the one avenue Vermont may not pursue is to pass a 
‘state moratorium’ on nuclear energy ‘grounded in safety 
concerns.’”112 Under this rationale, therefore, the Second Circuit held 
Acts 74 and 160 were preempted by the AEA. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF PACIFIC GAS, REVEALED IN VERMONT YANKEE 
A. Analytic Weaknesses of Pacific Gas 
A panel of three judges on the Second Circuit found federal 
preemption of the Vermont laws in Vermont Yankee, but Judge 
Susan Carney only “reluctantly” concurred113 in the decision. Judge 
Carney’s concurrence provides a solid outline for the analytic 
weaknesses in the Pacific Gas holding. Judge Carney stated that she 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. 
 107. For more detailed information on the factual history and the exact 
requirements of each state law, see Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 
838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (Dist. 2012) and Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 
733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 108. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 404. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 407. 
 111. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 112. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 434 (Carney, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 434 (emphasis omitted). See Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). 
2015] COMMENT 551 
 
 
 
was concerned, not with the majority’s reasoning under Pacific Gas, 
but that “Congress, in enacting the AEA, did not intend the result we 
reach.”114 She opined that the Second Circuit was led to its 
conclusion “principally by an expansive gloss on the preemptive 
scope of the AEA first set forth in PG&E.”115 She explained that “it 
is principally the judicial phrase ‘grounded in safety concerns’ and 
not the Court’s holdings or the text of the Atomic Energy Act, that 
compels us to strike down Vermont’s statutes.”116 Judge Carney’s 
concurrence deconstructs the Pacific Gas decision and in doing so 
reveals the problems with Pacific Gas that the Second Circuit was 
nonetheless bound to follow. 
First, Judge Carney acknowledged that under the explicit 
holding of Pacific Gas, “[a] state moratorium on nuclear 
construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the 
prohibited field.”117 Thus, under this Supreme Court instruction, the 
Vermont statutes would be preempted. Carney pointed out that 
given this Supreme Court instruction, it is ironic that in Pacific Gas 
the Court upheld a state law whose purpose was implicitly based on 
California’s safety concerns regarding the storage of excess nuclear 
waste.118 However, Carney recognized that this same language from 
Pacific Gas was reiterated in both Silkwood and English. She thus 
took the use and re-use of this same language in two subsequent 
cases at face value, accepting that a state moratorium on 
construction of a nuclear plant grounded in safety concerns would 
“be in the teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that 
nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread development and 
use—and would be preempted for that reason.”119 
The fact that this “state moratorium on nuclear construction 
grounded in safety concerns”120 language was dicta in all three of 
the key AEA preemption cases121 (since the Court said none of the 
cases, including Pacific Gas, fell into this category) has not seemed 
to matter all that much; lower courts have nonetheless relied upon it 
in deciding AEA federal preemption in other contexts.122 However, 
                                                                                                             
 114. Vermont Yankee, 733 F. 3d at 434. 
 115. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 213). 
 116. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 213. 
 121. Since the “state moratorium based on safety concerns” did not apply in 
Pacific Gas, Silkwood, or English. 
 122. See e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 
(10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2001). See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
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at least one scholar has noted that outside of the AEA context, the 
portion of the Pacific Gas holding that relies heavily on an analysis 
of the state legislature’s motive when passing a given state law has 
not been heavily relied upon in other areas of the law at all.123 
Judge Carney pointed out other analytic weaknesses of applying 
of Pacific Gas instruction to the Vermont Yankee dispute. She 
particularly noted that, in light of the two savings clauses that 
clarified the states’ role in nuclear energy regulation and allowed for 
increased federal-state cooperation,124 it was odd that the Vermont 
legislature’s concern about safety alone would be enough to 
invalidate a state law on the matter.125 She acknowledged that 
applying an overly close reading of the Pacific Gas dicta to Vermont 
Yankee undermines the general principle that absent “the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress” 126 there is a presumption against 
preemption in areas where the federal statute intrudes into state 
traditional roles. 
Moreover, Judge Carney gave credence to the presumption 
against preemption principle, stating, “as a practical matter, it seems 
impossible to divorce safety concerns from any State legislature’s 
consideration whether to allow, or continue to allow, the generation 
of nuclear power within its borders.”127 Clearly, state legislators will 
be tempted to consider radiological safety concerns when deciding 
whether to allow nuclear energy production in their state—this 
alone, however, should not doom the statute. The language of the 
AEA itself does not say that “a state moratorium on nuclear energy 
for safety concerns would be in the teeth of the preempted 
field”128—this is the Supreme Court’s interpretation which itself has 
been subject to dispute.129 There is a distinct disjuncture here 
                                                                                                             
 123. See Ferrey, supra note 3, at 67–68 (discussing how the Pacific Gas 
holding examines the importance of examining legislative purpose in the AEA 
context and has only been cited in approximately 5% of the instances where 
Pacific Gas has been relied on). According to Ferrey, “Very few opinions 
appear to have followed the holding from Pacific Gas that to the effect that the 
language in a piece of legislation is the final authority as to the actual purpose of 
that legislation.” Id. at 68. 
 124. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2021(k) (2012). 
 125. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F. 3d 393, 435 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 126. Id. (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)). See also Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining this presumption). 
 127. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at, 437 (Carney, J., concurring). 
 128. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983). 
 129. See Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 223–29 
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between what the AEA actually states and what the Supreme Court 
says that the AEA states. The former is the law itself, and the latter 
is judicial gloss on that law. The AEA explicitly leaves available to 
the states the opportunity to decide for themselves what kind of 
energy makeup they will have within their jurisdiction.130 Indeed, 
the Pacific Gas court itself acknowledged this distinct role for the 
states by recognizing the “dual regulation of nuclear-powered 
electricity.”131 
Finally, Judge Carney noted that one can glean a great deal 
from what Congress omitted from the AEA.132 Even though the 
purpose of the AEA was to promote the private development of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,133 the AEA does not require 
a state to host a nuclear energy plant or be forced to permit 
construction or continuous operation of a nuclear plant.134 Even 
more telling is the majority’s acknowledgment in Pacific Gas of 
this same general principle that, in spite of the AEA’s policy in 
favor of promoting the development of nuclear energy, the 
technology is not to be developed at all costs. Judge Carney ends 
by pointing out the glaring omission from the AEA that should 
give states authority to decide whether to host nuclear within their 
borders: “The legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient 
authority in the states to allow the development of nuclear power 
to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons.”135 
                                                                                                             
 130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect 
to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of 
nuclear facilities licensed by the [NRC]”). Id. at §2021(k) (“Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate 
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards”). 
 131. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F. 3d 393, 426 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See AEA Congressional Declaration of Policy, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012) 
(stating: “Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as 
military purposes. It is therefore declared to be the policy of the United States 
that (a) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so 
as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times 
to the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common 
defense and security; and (b) the development, use, and control of atomic energy 
shall be direct so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, 
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enterprise.”). See also Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 207. 
 134. Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 426. 
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B. Fundamental Problem: Legislative Motive Preemption Test is 
Untenable 
Judge Carney addresses the heart of the problem with Pacific 
Gas, as made manifest through its application in Vermont Yankee. 
She states that “[p]lacing decisive emphasis on motivation to the 
exclusion of impact . . . creates an irresistible incentive for States to 
do their best to mask their concerns about safety.”136 She points out 
what would seem to be the obvious—that safety and economic 
concerns necessarily relate to one another. Thus, it would be quite 
difficult, if not impossible, for a state legislature to divorce the two 
concerns from one another: “To rule that concern for safety is fatal 
to a State’s legislative initiatives is to disable the States from 
legislating within their borders to respond to the legitimate 
economic concerns of their citizens.”137 
This reasoning acknowledges that a state’s legitimate right to 
make use of the AEA’s dual regulatory scheme and legislate 
according to that state’s economic needs could be usurped by an 
individual state legislator’s inappropriate, or in some cases 
inadvertent, reference to safety concerns. Indeed, in the Vermont 
Yankee context, the legislators of Vermont were not concerned solely 
with the safety of the plant. This is clearly the case given that the plant 
had been in operation in the same place in Vernon, Vermont for 40 
years, and the plant had not created any significant hazards in the 
recent past.138 Additionally, Vermont Yankee had created economic 
benefits for the community, such as employment opportunities and 
the supply of clean, low-cost energy.139 The citizens of Vermont were 
interested in moving towards the development of their wind, solar, 
and biomass renewable energy sector,140 which was categorized by 
the State of Vermont in its Reply Brief as an economic question of a 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. at 437. 
 137. Id. 
 138. There was documentation of one nuclear leak in 2004 that the plant 
cleaned up. The NRC conducted an investigation and determined that no hazard 
came from the leak. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. 
Supp. 2d 183, 214–15(D. Vt. 2012). 
 139. In 2013, the plant had 630 employees. See Nuclear Sites, Vermont 
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information/vermont_yankee.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/G2K3-GSJZ (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 140. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 426 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (discussing how the Vermont Public Service Board had held a number 
of public meetings where many individuals stated they opposed allowing a new 
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environmental harm”). 
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state’s power scheme.141 However, the broad language of Pacific Gas 
nullifies and sweeps such economic concerns under the rug in the face 
of documented safety concerns. Such a result does not reflect the 
“dual regulatory authority” intended by the AEA. Nonetheless, 
Pacific Gas requires reliance upon state legislative motive to 
determine whether federal law preempts the state law, and in Vermont 
Yankee, the Second Circuit complied with this reasoning. 
The problem with relying wholly on state legislative motive 
and looking beyond the expressly stated purposes of a given statute 
is two-fold. First, such overreliance on motive incentivizes state 
legislatures to hide their true motives if they want to legislate on 
nuclear safety. Pacific Gas and Vermont Yankee provide a clear 
blueprint for how a state legislature can regulate a nuclear power 
plant out of existence. All that is needed is for the state legislature 
to hide any true, safety-related reasons and provide plausible 
economic reasons instead, and the state law should stand. In 
Vermont Yankee, if the legislators had done a better job of covering 
their tracks and hiding their true motives in the legislative history 
then, under Pacific Gas, their laws would have likely been upheld. 
From a basic public policy standpoint, one cannot logically infer 
that when Congress passed the AEA, it intended that state 
legislatures should be able to prevail with their state nuclear safety-
related laws by deceiving the judiciary regarding their true, safety-
focused motives. However, under a strict legislative-motive federal 
preemption test, such deceit is incentivized. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, such a motive-focused 
inquiry provides unclear guidance to other states that may want to 
legislate on nuclear energy issues.142 The Second Circuit majority in 
Vermont Yankee acknowledged that, as the law currently stands, no 
one knows how great a role the legislative history should play in the 
preemption test.143 This will necessarily be the case with a motive-
based preemption test due to the subjective nature of the motive-
focused inquiry. Even if the Supreme Court were to take this matter 
up in the future and spell out exactly how closely a court must 
analyze a given legislature’s motive, with a subjective test such as 
this based on the intent of legislators––which will necessarily be 
                                                                                                             
 141. See Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 6–7, Entergy 
Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 426 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-
707-cv(L)). 
 142. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 426 (2d 
Cir. 2013). See also id. at 419 n.27 (conceding that “Pacific Gas does not explain 
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ambiguous, the test as it is cannot provide clear guidance regarding 
permissible laws under the AEA. 
Support for this ambiguity is seen in the opposite outcomes that 
arose in Pacific Gas as compared to Vermont Yankee. In the 
former, legislative intent was not delved into very much,144 and in 
the latter, it was scrutinized quite closely. Because such level of 
scrutiny is necessarily subjective, a Pacific Gas-style legislative 
motive-focused test will always be unreliable and provide unclear 
guidance to states regarding the areas within the nuclear field that 
they may legislate without fear of federal preemption. The 
Supreme Court has long acknowledged this fundamental problem 
with legislative motive-based tests: 
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine . . . that 
state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long 
as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in 
mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it 
is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our 
Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state 
legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation 
by simply publishing a legislative committee report 
articulating some state interest or policy-other than 
frustration of the federal objective-that would be tangentially 
furthered by the proposed state law. . . [A]ny state legislation 
which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is 
rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.145 
The Supreme Court’s mention of the “frustration of the full 
effectiveness of federal law”146 implies that the inquiry should be into 
what effect the state law has on the federal scheme, without concern 
for the state legislature’s purpose in passing the law. Indeed, the Court 
acknowledges this tenet147 in both Pacific Gas and English. However, 
                                                                                                             
 144. The Pacific Gas majority said that it did not even need to address this 
question because there is a permissible, economic rationale for the law as it currently 
stands. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 222. 
 145. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651–52 (1971) (emphasis added). See 
also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1992). 
 146. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 105–06. 
 147. “[Although] part of the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the 
purpose of the state law in question . . . another part of the field is defined by the 
state law’s actual effect.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990) 
(referencing Pac. Gas, 416 U.S. at 212, “[T]he statute does not seek to regulate 
the construction of operation of a nuclear power plant. It would clearly be 
impermissible for California to do so, for such regulation, even if enacted out of 
non-safety concerns, would nevertheless [infringe upon] the NRC’s exclusive 
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the Court then switches its position by crafting a broad test under 
which any reference to safety concerns will preempt a state law.148 
Given that this is not the way that federal preemption works in other 
contexts, as well as for the reasons discussed above, the legislative 
motive test should be struck in favor of a more tailored AEA 
preemption test. A look at federal preemption in the context of 
immigration law, as well as in the application of the Pacific Gas test 
in a number of federal circuit courts, provides guidance for 
formulating an alternative AEA preemption test. 
1. Federal Preemption in the Context of Immigration Law 
In 2012, the Supreme Court addressed federal preemption law 
in the context of immigration law in Arizona v. United States.149 
The United States challenged four provisions of Arizona’s state 
law under the doctrine of federal preemption. The Court found that 
the pervasive regulatory scheme that the federal government 
maintains over immigration matters, the need for uniformity of 
immigration laws as they relate to foreign relations, as well as the 
Constitution’s dictate that the national government have the power 
to “establish a uniform Rule of Nationalization,”150 all provided 
evidence for federal field preemption of state laws in the context of 
United States immigration policy.151 Specifically with regard to 
Arizona’s law on alien registration, the Court looked to precedent 
that had previously established federal field preemption.152 
 One of Arizona’s four proposed laws was Section 3 of S.B. 170 
which created a new state misdemeanor, forbidding “willful failure 
to complete or carry an alien registration document . . . in violation 
of 8 U.S.C. §1304(e) or §1306(a).” Section 3 effectively created 
steeper state law penalties for violating federal law. In determining 
                                                                                                             
 148. Pac. Gas, 416 U.S. at 212–13. 
“[T]he federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety 
concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the states . . . A 
state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls 
squarely within the prohibited field. Moreover, a state judgment that 
nuclear power is not safe enough to be further developed would conflict 
directly with the countervailing judgment of the NRC . . . A state 
prohibition on nuclear construction for safety reasons would also be in the 
teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that nuclear 
technology be safe enough for widespread development and use-and would 
be preempted for that reason.” 
Id. 
 149. 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4. 
 151. Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 152. Id. at 2498–99 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1940)). 
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that the state law was preempted, the Court looked to the presumed 
effect of the law and analyzed how the enactment of the law would 
affect the federal government’s regulatory scheme: 
If §3 of the Arizona statute were valid, every State could give 
itself independent authority to prosecute federal registration 
violations, diminish[ing] the [Federal Government]’s control 
over enforcement and detract[ing] from the integrated scheme 
of regulation created by Congress.153 
Nowhere in its discussion of Section 3 or the other challenged 
Arizona provisions does the Supreme Court give weight to the 
state’s legislative motive in its preemption analysis. Instead, the 
Court focused on how the state laws, if enacted, would affect the 
federal regulatory scheme in order to determine preemption. 
2. Lower Courts’ Interpretation of AEA Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence 
a. U.S. v. Kentucky 
In U.S. v. Kentucky the Sixth Circuit addressed federal 
preemption of state-issued permits that contained conditions relating 
to the disposal of certain radioactive waste in a federal Department 
of Energy-operated landfill.154 The Sixth Circuit used the blunt 
“does it fall within the entire field of nuclear concerns” preemption 
test from Pacific Gas reasoning that “the AEA preempts any state 
attempt to regulate materials covered by the Act for safety 
purposes.”155 Under this analysis, and similar to the reasoning in 
Vermont Yankee, the Sixth Circuit succinctly ruled that the state-
issued permit conditions fell within the AEA-preempted field, and 
thus the Kentucky state requirements were struck down. 
b. U.S. v. Manning 
Not all circuits, however, have used such a blunt, purpose-based 
preemption approach. In United States v. Manning, the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the AEA preemption question regarding a Washington 
law called the Cleanup Priority Act (“CPA”).156 The CPA was to 
add new provisions concerning mixed radioactive waste “requiring 
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. at 2502 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould, Inc. 475 U.S. 
282, 288–89 (1986)). 
 154. See 252 F.3d 816, 820 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 155. Id. at 823. 
 156. See 527 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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cleanup of contamination before additional waste is added, 
prioritizing cleanup, [and] providing for public participation and 
enforcement through citizen lawsuits.”157 
The Ninth Circuit deviated from the blunt Pacific Gas test and 
interpreted the AEA preemption inquiry through the lens of English, 
saying that the AEA would preempt the CPA if: (1) the purpose of 
the CPA was to regulate against radiation hazards or (2) if the CPA 
directly affected decisions concerning radiological safety. Even 
though the Ninth Circuit found the state law to be preempted on 
both grounds,158 it was nonetheless noteworthy that the Ninth 
Circuit used this more all-encompassing test, instead of just relying 
on the purpose of the state statute at issue as basis for striking the 
law. 
c. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson 
In Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians,159 an Indian tribe and 
a private company that planned to build a storage facility for spent 
nuclear waste brought suit against the State of Utah after the state 
legislature passed laws regulating the storage and transportation of 
nuclear waste.160 The Tenth Circuit held that federal law 
preempted the Utah statutes. However, instead of looking solely to 
the Pacific Gas instruction that relied so heavily on a state 
legislature’s intent, the Tenth Circuit also included analysis from 
the Court’s unanimous holding in English which said that both the 
purpose and the effect of a given law should be analyzed to 
determine whether the AEA preempted the state laws. 
The Tenth Circuit addressed both the purpose and the effect of 
the state laws in question but ultimately struck all three. The Tenth 
Circuit addressed whether the Utah laws had an impermissible 
“direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who 
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety 
                                                                                                             
 157. Id. at 833. 
 158. Id. at 836. 
 159. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 160. The statutes at issue fell into three general categories: (1) [establishment 
of] state licensing requirements for the storage of [spent nuclear fuel] (SNF), 
and which revoke common law grants of limited liability to stockholders in 
companies engaged in storing SNF; (2) [provisions] which require county 
governments to impose regulations and restrictions on SNF storage; (3) [road 
provisions] which vest power to the Governor to regulate road construction 
around the proposed site. Id. at 1228. 
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levels.”161 Such an inquiry was mentioned but notably not relied 
upon by the Second Circuit in Vermont Yankee. 
III. PROPOSAL: EFFECTS TEST FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION  
A. Analysis Based on a State Law’s Effect on Safety Regulation 
By looking at how the Supreme Court has recently employed 
federal preemption of state law in the immigration context, as well 
as three lower courts’ varied approaches to AEA preemption, one 
can glean overall guiding principles of federal preemption law. 
These principles are as follows: presumption against preemption 
when dealing with historic state police powers,162 congressional 
intent as the touchstone inquiry,163 and the Supreme Court’s 
teachings that a state law’s effect should be given full attention in 
preemption analysis.164 When one holds these principles up to how 
the Pacific Gas instructions unfolded in Vermont Yankee, the 
overreliance on legislative intent becomes clear. In light of the 
need for uniformity so that both state legislatures and lower courts 
have a predictable standard to follow, the federal preemption 
legislative motive test should be reformulated so inquiry into the 
state legislature’s motive would not be required at all. 
Such a reformulation would allow for total bypass of the problem 
that was enunciated in Vermont Yankee at the district court where, in 
response to Entergy’s lawyer, a state witness noted, “The fact that you 
have this cacophony of ostensibly preempted inputs and unpreempted 
output, doesn’t mean that somebody’s dealing in pretexts or trickery, 
it means, the product worked, and the prohibited beginning became 
an accessible end. That’s not trickery, that’s legislation.”165 Or, to 
quote an oft-mentioned reference to lawmaking, “[t]o retain respect 
                                                                                                             
 161. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990). 
 162. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
 163. Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). 
 164. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1992) 
(citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651–52 (1971),“[W]e can no longer adhere 
to the aberrational doctrine. . . that state law may frustrate the operation of federal 
law as long as the state legislature . . . had some purpose in mind other than one of 
frustration. . . Any State legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal 
law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.” See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (noting that “when considering the purpose of a 
challenged statute, this Court is not bound by the name, description or 
characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of the state, but will 
determine for itself the practical impact of the law.” (emphasis added))). 
 165. See Ferrey, supra note 3, at 20. 
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for sausages and laws, one must not watch them in the making.”166 
Omitting reliance on legislative intent altogether would align with the 
longstanding principles of federal preemption generally and would 
allow for a more predictable—and more honest—test. 
Regarding how to formulate a more predictable AEA federal 
preemption test, one can find guidance in the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of Arizona’s alien registration law. In that case, the Court 
determined that the Arizona alien registration law was preempted by 
focusing on the anticipated effect of the law if it were enacted, and 
how that effect would impact the federal regulatory immigration 
scheme. Use of the effect-focused inquiry such as that in Arizona v. 
U.S. would go a step further than the Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. 
Manning, which construed AEA Supreme Court jurisprudence as 
requiring preemption either when a statute has an impermissible 
purpose or an impermissible effect.167 Employing a test similar to 
the immigration effects test would also go a step further than in 
Skull Valley where the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Supreme 
Court AEA jurisprudence dictated an analysis of both the purpose 
and the effect of the law.168 The analogy to Arizona is useful 
because it provides a means of moving away from AEA preemption 
ambiguity in favor of a clearer standard. Additionally, Arizona 
provides a helpful analogy because in both the Arizona analysis of 
Section 3 and in the Pacific Gas decision, the Court acknowledged 
that federal field preemption was in effect in both cases—in Pacific 
Gas the field was “radiological safety aspects”169 and in Arizona the 
field was “alien registration laws.”170 
Similar to the Court’s discussion in English and its holding in 
Arizona, the first step of a more tailored test might be to ask: What 
is the “direct and substantial effect”171 of the state nuclear law? 
Once the anticipated effect of the law is determined, the second step 
would then be to ask: Does the direct and substantial effect of the 
state nuclear law substantially impact the NRC’s safety regulation 
function?172 If the answer to step two is “yes,” then the state law 
would be preempted by the federal nuclear regulatory scheme. 
                                                                                                             
 166. Ferrey, supra note 3, at 20 (citing Chancellor Otto von Bismark, In re 
Graham, 104 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1958)). 
 167. See United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 836–38 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 168. See Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 
1248 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 169. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983). 
 170. Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 171. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990). 
 172. The inquiry laid out in English was whether the law had some direct and 
substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear 
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Of importance to this test is the use of the phrase “safety 
regulation function” as opposed to the phrase “safety concerns” used 
by the Supreme Court in Pacific Gas. This change should be made for 
a number of reasons. First, the AEA’s explicit proviso states “this 
section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local 
agency any authority to regulate, control or restrict any activities of 
the Commission.”173 The use of the word “regulation” thus better 
aligns with the wording of the AEA’s proviso itself. In that same vein, 
the use of the word “safety concerns”174 opens up the federally 
preempted field too much, making it more likely that state laws 
implicating both safety and economic concerns would be struck 
down, even if their effect was ultimately permissible. As noted by 
Judge Carney in Vermont Yankee, under the AEA Vermont has the 
right to decide to completely halt production of nuclear energy within 
its jurisdiction.175 The reasons for which a legislature bases its 
decision should not be given such weight as to strike the law if the 
effect of the law itself was permissible under the federal scheme. A 
narrower test such as the “effect on safety regulation” test would 
bring the jurisprudence into line with the text of the AEA. 
B. Application of Effect on Safety Regulation Test to Previously 
Decided Cases 
The strength of the effect on safety regulation of the two-part 
test is demonstrated when the new test is applied to fact patterns 
from previous cases. For example, if the effect on safety regulation 
test was applied to Pacific Gas, the outcome would likely be the 
same. However, the reasoning would rely, not on California’s 
avowed economic purpose, but would instead look to the actual 
effect of the law. In Pacific Gas, the effect of the nuclear waste 
disposal means requirement was to halt construction of nuclear 
plants until the NRC had finished its disposal means plan. Halting 
construction of a nuclear power plant is perfectly within the 
bounds of the AEA’s proviso. Thus, the test would allow for the 
same outcome in the Pacific Gas context. 
                                                                                                             
 
facilities concerning radiological safety levels. Id. at 85. In English, the Court 
unanimously determined that the whistleblower anti-retaliation tort action did 
not have such an effect and was thus not preempted by the AEA. Id. at 90. 
 173. 42 U.S.C. 2021(k) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 174. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 212. 
 175. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 436–
38 (2d Cir. 2013) (Carney, J., concurring). 
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The effect on safety regulation test, however, would render the 
opposite result in Silkwood. The first step would be to ask: What is 
the direct and substantial effect of the state law tort claim in 
Silkwood? The response would be that the state law tort claim 
allowed for a $10 million punitive damages award against a nuclear 
plant based on the jury’s thoughts about nuclear safety, aimed at 
punishing the nuclear power plant into modifying its safety 
procedures. The second step would be to ask whether this effect—
the $10 million punitive damages award against a nuclear power 
company––would have a substantial impact on the NRC’s safety 
regulation function. It certainly could because, at least in Silkwood, 
the NRC investigatory team found no violation of safety procedures 
connected to the plutonium contamination, but the jury nonetheless 
returned a $10 million punitive damages award as a means of 
prompting the nuclear company to improve its safety procedures 
(when under federal law, their procedures were perfectly fine). 176 
As applied to English, the effect on safety regulation test would 
likely produce the same outcome since, in that case, the anti-
retaliation issue that was presented did not directly implicate safety 
regulations but instead concerned plaintiff’s status as a whistleblower 
and her corresponding intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim. 
Finally, if the effect on safety regulation test were applied to 
Vermont Yankee, the outcome would be that Vermont’s Acts 74 and 
160, two laws that were preempted under the current analysis, would 
stand under the proposed effects test. In response to the first 
question—What is the direct and substantial effect of the two 
laws?—the anticipated effect was to force the closure of the plant.177 
                                                                                                             
 176. 464 U.S. 238, 245 (1984). 
 177. The Second Circuit in Vermont Yankee addressed the noteworthy fact that 
the electricity generation regulatory landscape is quite different now from in the 
1980s and 1990s, which was closer in time to when the Supreme Court issued its 
1983 Pacific Gas decision. See Vermont Yankee, 733 F.3d at 411. It is relevant to 
point out that in the 1980s, all states were vertically-integrated entities that sold the 
power they generated directly to their in-state retail customers. Then, state regulatory 
agencies would focus on what retail rates were sold to the public. Essentially, this 
framework meant that in 1982, California’s argument that if a local utility’s 
operating costs rose, those increases would be directly passed on to the public. 
Nowadays, however, the regulatory framework is different and accommodates 
“merchant generators” who sell the power they generate wholesale across state lines. 
While this market change is good to keep in mind, it should not impact the outcome 
of preemption analysis. If Congress wants to amend the AEA to bring it up to date 
with the new electricity regulatory scheme, it is wholly empowered to do that. The 
court, through use of a preemption test, should not be concerned with this though. 
For more information, see generally Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 
733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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Then, the question would be whether this effect impacts the NRC’s 
safety regulation function. The answer would have to be no, because 
even though the NRC would be involved in ensuring the safety of 
the plant as long as it was operational and during decommissioning 
that would not implicate the NRC’s function itself. The NRC 
procedure for shutting down would remain the same whether the 
Vermont Yankee plant closed or not. However, with regard to Act 
189, which the Second Circuit found not ripe for review, that law 
directly required state-sponsored nuclear technical inspections, 
which would fall squarely within the NRC’s purview. Thus, a law 
such as Act 189 would be preempted under this new formula. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the varied interpretations of Pacific Gas in recent 
years, as well as the Second Circuit’s own acknowledgment that it 
remains unclear how much weight legislative intent should receive 
in the nuclear energy context, the Supreme Court should consider a 
reformulation of the nuclear energy federal preemption test. 
Applying the proposed “effect on safety regulation” test seems to 
produce an outcome that is more in line with the actual language 
and structure of the AEA—allowing states to make the decision 
regarding their desired local energy mix but leaving the technical 
safety regulation questions to the experts at the NRC. Such a result 
indicates that this test would be preferable to the current guideline. 
The Supreme Court should take heed and seek to clarify its 
guideline when this issue arises in the future. 
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